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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Philip W. Savrin*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the 1999 decisions of the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals that have a significant impact on issues relating to trial
practice and procedure.
II.

REMOVAL JURISDICTION

In Blab TV of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Communications,Inc.,'
the court had to decide "whether section 612 of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 completely preempts state-law tort and breach
of contract claims involving 'leased access' cable channels such that the
claims are removable to federal court."2 At the time the lawsuit was
filed, Blab T.V. was Mobile's only locally owned and operated television
station. Comcast was Mobile's cable operator as defined by the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984. After a contract dispute, Blab T.
filed a complaint in Alabama state court against Comcast, alleging fraud
and breach of contract.3
Comcast removed the case to federal district court and argued that
Section 612 of the Act provided federal jurisdiction over Blab T.V.'s state

* Partner in the firm of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Clark
University (B.A., with high honors, 1981); Boston University (J.D., cum laude, 1985). Law
Clerk for the Honorable Harold L. Murphy of the Northern District of Georgia, 1988-1990.
Staff Attorney, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 1985-1988.
Member, American Bar Association, State Bar of Georgia, Defense Research Institute,
Federal Bar Association.
1. 182 F.3d 851 (11th Cir. 1999).
2. Id. at 852.
3. Id. at 853.
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law claims.4 Section 612 regulates the manner in which operators like
Comcast deal with local and affiliated broadcasters such as Blab T.V.5
Section 612 also creates a federal right of action in district court for
unaffiliated programmers who are injured by a cable operator's failure
or refusal to make commercial lease access channels available. 6
Blab T.V. did not object to the removal of its lawsuit to federal court.
However, it did file a motion to remand when Comcast filed a motion to
strike Blab T.V.'s demands for a jury trial and punitive damages because
Comcast argued neither was permitted under Section 612. 7
The district court ruled in favor of Comcast, holding that Section 612
comes within the "complete preemption" doctrine and that Blab T.V.'s
state law claims arose under Section 612. Upon Blab T.V.'s motion for
reconsideration, the district court certified for interlocutory appeal the
question of whether Blab T.V.'s state law claims are completely
preempted by Section 612 and whether Section 612 confers removal
jurisdiction on district courts. 8
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by setting forth the Supreme
Court's explanation that "complete preemption occurs when 'the preemptive force of a statute is so "extraordinary" that it converts an
ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule."9 However, the Supreme
Court has never enthusiastically applied the complete preemption
doctrine in areas of law other than the Labor Management Relations
Act ("LMRA") and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA").' 0 Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit had never before applied the
complete preemption doctrine in areas of law other than the LMRA or
ERISA."
After analyzing other circuits' rulings on whether the complete
preemption doctrine applies outside the LMRA or ERISA context,12 the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the inquiry focused on
"whether Congress not only intended a given federal statute to provide
a federal defense to a state cause of action that could be asserted either

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1)(A) (1994).
Id. § 532(d).
182 F.3d at 853.
Id. at 853-54.
Id. at 854 (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)).
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id. at 856-57.
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in a state or federal court, but also intended to grant a defendant the
ability to remove the adjudication of the cause of action to a federal
court by transforming the state cause of action into a federal [one]."1
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it should resolve the issue by
14
looking at congressional intent behind the Act.
While the Act did not directly address the issue, the court noted that
"Section 612(a) contains jurisdictional language that is similar to Section
301 of the LMRA, which according to [the Supreme Court], supports
complete preemption." 5 However, the Act's legislative history does not
indicate "that Section 612(a)'s jurisdictional language is intended to
function in the same manner as Section 301 of the LMRA." 16 Because
of the absence of such a statement, the Eleventh Circuit focused on other
provisions in the Act and its legislative history. 7 In so doing, the court
found that the Act has a "broad policy of preserving state authority
except in areas in which the exercise of this authority would be
inconsistent with federal law."8 For example, one of the Act's purposes
is "to 'establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local
authority with respect to the regulation of cable systems.'"'" Moreover,
the Act provides that "'[niothing in this subchapter shall be construed
to restrict a State from exercising jurisdiction with regard to cable
services consistent with this subchapter.'" 20
The Eleventh Circuit then concluded that these provisions contemplated the application of state law and state court jurisdiction to some
degree in the cable services industry.21 The inclusion of these provisions, the court reasoned, demonstrates that Congress did not intend for
the complete preemption doctrine to apply to the Act as it does to the
LMRA and ERISA.'
Accordingly, the court concluded "that Section
612 of the Cable Act does not confer removal jurisdiction over [Blab
T.V's] state law claims pursuant to the complete preemption doctrine."23

13. Id. at 857 (quoting Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of
TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1797-98 (1998)) (alteration in original).

Definition, 76

14. Id.
15. Id.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 521(3) (1994)).
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1994)) (alteration in original).
at 857-58.
at 858.
at 859.
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ARBITRATION

Equitable Estoppel
In MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklin,24 the Eleventh Circuit had
to determine whether a nonsignatory to a contract could be compelled to
submit to mandatory arbitration under a mandatory arbitration clause
within that contract. Sharon Franklin purchased a vehicle from Jim
Burke Motors. The Buyer's Order executed by the parties incorporated
by reference a Retail Installment Contract in which Franklin was
charged $990 for a service contract through MS Dealer.25 The Buyer's
Order contained an arbitration clause that provided that "[aill disputes
and controversies of every kind and nature between the parties hereto
arising out of or in connection with this contract... shall be submitted
to binding arbitration."" MS Dealer did not sign either the Buyer's
Order or the Retail Installment Contract."
After discovering defects in her car, Franklin filed suit in Alabama
state court against Jim Burke Motors, MS Dealer, and Chrysler Credit
Corporation, alleging that MS Dealer cooperated, conspired, and colluded
with Jim Burke Motors and Chrysler Credit Corporation to defraud her
in connection with the purchase of the service contract. Relying on the
arbitration clause, MS Dealer petitioned the district court to compel
Franklin to submit to arbitration. The district court dismissed the
petition because MS Dealer did not sign the Buyer's Order and, thus,
lacked standing to compel arbitration. 8
Even though arbitration is a matter of contract, the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that there are three exceptions that prevent the lack of a
written arbitration agreement from being an impediment to arbitration. 29 The first exception is equitable estoppel."0 The second exception arises when "'under agency or related principles, the relationship
between the signatory and nonsignatory defendants is sufficiently close
that only by permitting the nonsignatory to invoke arbitration may
evisceration of the underlying arbitration agreement between the

A.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

177 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 944.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 945.
Id. at 947.
Id.
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signatories be avoided.'" 31 Finally, the third exception "'arises when
the parties to a contract together agree, upon formation of their
agreement, to confer certain benefits thereunder upon a third party,
affording that third party rights of action against them under the
contract.'"32
Although MS Dealer argued that each of the three exceptions applied,
the Eleventh Circuit focused only on the equitable estoppel exception
and noted that there are two circumstances in which equitable estoppel
allows a nonsignatory to compel arbitration. 3 "First, equitable estoppel
applies when the signatory to a written agreement containing an
arbitration clause 'must rely on the terms of the written agreement in
asserting [its] claims' against the nonsignatory." 4 Second, "'application
of equitable estoppel is warranted ... when the signatory [to the
contract containing the arbitration clause] raises allegations of...
substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the
35
nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.'"
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit had to determine whether the nature of
Franklin's fraud claims against MS Dealer fell within the scope of the
arbitration clause contained in the Buyer's Order.3"
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that both circumstances giving rise to
the application of equitable estoppel were present.3 7 First, plaintiff's
fraud claim against MS Dealer referred to the $990 charge for the
service contract, which was contained in the Retail Installment Contract
and incorporated by reference into the Buyer's Order. 8 Consequently,
each of Franklin's claims relied upon her contractual obligation to pay
the $990 charge for the service contract. 39 Additionally, Franklin's
claims against Jim Burke Motors and MS Dealer were based on the
same facts because she alleged that MS Dealer worked in concert with
Jim Burke Motors in the alleged fraudulent plan.4" This allegation of
collusive behavior clearly demonstrated that her claims against MS
Dealer were intertwined with the obligations imposed by the Buyer's

31. Id.
1997)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
(11th Cir.

(quoting Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423, 1432 (M.D. Ala.
(quoting Boyd, 981 F. Supp. at 1429).
(quoting Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757
1993)) (alteration in original).

35. Id. (quoting Boyd, 981 F. Supp. at 1433).
36. Id.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 947-48.
Id. at 948.
Id.
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Order.4' For these reasons the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
Franklin was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration with MS
Dealer.42
B. Appellate Jurisdiction
The Eleventh Circuit was confronted with another issue of first
4
impression in Randolph v. Green Thee Financial Corp.-Alabama.
In
Randolph the court had to decide whether a district court's order
compelling arbitration is an appealable "final decision" when it dismisses
the remaining claims. Plaintiff purchased a mobile home and financed
that purchase through Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama. The Retail
Installment Contract between the parties contained an arbitration
clause
44
that required binding arbitration to resolve all disputes.
Plaintiff filed suit in federal court alleging that defendant violated the
Truth in Lending Act and the Equal Credit Act. Defendant responded
by moving to compel plaintiff to arbitrate her complaint pursuant to the
arbitration agreement and by moving to stay the case until arbitration
occurred or, alternatively, to dismiss the case.45
After concluding that all the issues raised in plaintiff's complaint had
to be submitted to arbitration, the district court dismissed plaintiff's
claims with prejudice. 46 After plaintiff appealed, defendant moved to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 47 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit had to
determine whether the district court's order compelling arbitration and
dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice could be classified as a
"'final decision with respect to an arbitration'" under Section 16(a)(3) of
the Federal Arbitration Act.48
In analyzing whether it had jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit first
examined a distinction drawn by other circuits between embedded and
independent proceedings. 49 "An 'embedded' proceeding is one in which
the arbitration issue arises as part of a broader action dealing with other
issues." 0 However, "an 'independent' proceeding [is one in which] the
motion to compel arbitration is the only issue before the court."5 Other

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1151.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

51.

Id.

1151-52.
1152.
1152-53 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) (1994)).
1153.
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circuits have found that orders compelling arbitration in embedded
proceedings should be treated as interlocutory and nonappealable
because the district court still has other issues remaining in the case to
resolve, and, thus, it52 could not be considered a final decision for purposes
of Section 16(a)(3).
In Randolph, although it was an embedded proceeding because
plaintiff alleged substantive violations of federal law, the dismissal of
the action left no additional issues for the district court to resolve.53
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the distinction between54
embedded and independent proceedings did not resolve the issue.
Further, the court noted,
In most arbitration appeals there will be little difference between the
traditional definition of "final decision" and one that relies on the
distinction between embedded and independent proceedings. If the
district court's order compelling arbitration in a so-called embedded
proceeding leaves other issues unresolved, the court will have more left
to do than simply execute the judgment, so there will be no final
decision. But that is not true in cases such as this one, where the
district court dispensed with the remaining issues by dismissing the
case.5
The court also noted that there was nothing in Section 16 that required
it to distinguish between embedded and independent proceedings.5 6
Instead, the court focused on the Federal Arbitration Act's legislative
history to resolve the issue. 7
Specifically, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that
"under the proposed statute, appealability does not turn solely on the
policy favoring arbitration. Appeal can be taken from ... a final
judgment dismissing an action in deference to arbitration. These
appeals preserve the general policy that appeals should be5 available
where there is nothing left to be done in the district court." 1
The court concluded that when a district court orders arbitration and,
by dismissing the remaining claims with prejudice, it effectively disposes
of all other issues, the Eleventh Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over

52. Id.
53. Id. at 1155.
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1156.
58. Id. (quoting Committee on the Judiciary, Section-by.Section Analysis on S1482,
100th Cong., 2d Seas., 134 CONG. REc. S16284 (1988)).
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the case.59 Consequently, the court proceeded to determine the
enforceability of the arbitration clause and concluded that it was
unenforceable.' 0
IV. ABSTENTION
In Posnerv. Essex Insurance Co.,61 plaintiff sued a Bermuda corporation and a Pennsylvania corporation in federal court under an insurance
policy that plaintiff had purchased from the Bermuda corporation. After
denying the allegations, the Bermuda corporation filed a declaratory
judgment action in Bermuda seeking a ruling on the validity of the
insurance policies issued to plaintiff. Meanwhile, the Bermuda
corporation argued in the district court that the international abstention
doctrine compelled the court to dismiss or stay the action. After
dismissing some counts for lack of personal jurisdiction, the district court
agreed and dismissed the remaining claims under the international
abstention doctrine.6 2
On appeal plaintiff argued that the district court erred by not
following Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.,3 which the United
States Supreme Court decided in 1996." The Court held that "federal
courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention
principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise
discretionary. "6
Otherwise, "federal courts have a strict duty to
exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress."6 6
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit found that Quackenbush's
applicability to international abstention was an issue of first impression.67 In holding that Quackenbush does not apply to international
abstention, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the fact that the issue in
Quackenbush was "'whether the principles underlying our abstention
cases would support the remand or dismissal of a common-law action for
damages."'6 Thus, the court ruled that the Supreme Court in Quackenbush cited "only cases in which federal court actions risk interfering
with state proceedings or authority."6 9 The court also noted that "the

59. Id.
60. Id. at 1157-59.
61. 178 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
62. Id. at 1213-14.
63. 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
64. 178 F.3d at 1222.
65. 517 U.S. at 731.
66. Id. at 716.
67. 178 F.3d at 1222.
68. Id. at 1222-23 (quoting Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 719).
69. Id. at 1223.
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Supreme Court's admonition that courts generally must exercise their
nondiscretionary authority in cases over which Congress has granted
them jurisdiction" only applies to abstention doctrines that concern
federalism issues.70
Because the relationship between the federal courts and the states is
different from the relationship between the federal courts and foreign
nations, the Eleventh Circuit found that Quackenbush has no impact on
international abstention. 7'
Thus, the court turned to precedent
established in Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH 2 that
addressed international abstention. 73 Finding Turner Entertainment
unaffected by Quackenbush, the court applied the relevant three-factor
test from Turner Entertainment to the abstention issue and concluded
that abstention was justified, but that the district court should have
stayed the counts for which jurisdiction was proper.74

V. FINAL JUDGMENT
The issue in Snapper, Inc. v. Redan75 (also of first impression) was
"whether ... a district court's remand order is reviewable when the
court issued the order to enforce a contractual forum selection clause."7"
Snapper, a Georgia corporation, had a business relationship with KPM
Distributors, a New Jersey corporation, and KPMNY Distributors, a New
York corporation. As part of an expansion agreement, three officers of
KPM and their spouses assumed personal liability for all of KPM's
obligations to Snapper when they executed six identical security
agreements.77
Approximately four years later, a dispute arose between Snapper and
KPM regarding payment for equipment. KPM sued Snapper in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and Snapper
filed a counterclaim. Rather than filing a third-party claim in the New
Jersey federal action against the six guarantors, Snapper sued in the
Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia against the guarantors, but
not KMP. The guarantors then removed the case to the Northern
District of Georgia and moved to transfer the case to the District of New

70. Id.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
25 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994).
178 F.3d at 1223.
Id. at 1223-24.
171 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1250-51.
Id. at 1251.
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Jersey for consolidation with KPM's action. Snapper opposed the
guarantors' motion and moved to remand the case to the state court.78
The district court found "that the forum selection clause in each the
security agreements signed by the guarantors constituted a waiver of
their right to remove." 71 In particular, the district court interpreted the
terms.of the forum selection clause to allow Snapper to choose to litigate
either in a Georgia state court or in the Northern District of Georgia. 0
Because "removal premised on diversity jurisdiction was a right based
on domicile," the guarantors, by the terms of the security agreements,
had waived any rights afforded to them by virtue of their domicile."
Thus, the district court ruled that the guarantors could not remove the
action.82 Accordingly, "[tihe district court ...

remanded the action to

[Georgia] state court and dismissed the motion to change venue."83
In determining whether it had appellate jurisdiction, the Eleventh
Circuit examined the language of the statute governing procedure after
removal.8 4 That statute provides, in relevant part, that "[an order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise." 5 However, "the [United States]
Supreme Court has held that § 1447(d) bars appellate review only where
the remand order is based upon the grounds specified in § 1447(c)."'
Because the remand order in Snapper was based upon a forum selection
clause, the Eleventh Circuit had to determine "whether a remand order
based upon a forum 8selection
clause fits within one of the grounds
7
specified in § 1447(c)."
Section 1447(c) indicates that a district court may order a remand if
there is either a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect other than

78. Id.
79. Id. at 1251-52.
80. Id. at 1252.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1252-54.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1994).
86. 171 F.3d at 1252 (citing Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336,346
(1976)).
87. Id. That statute provides, in relevant part, that
[a] motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject
matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of
removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. III 1997).
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a lack of subject matter jurisdiction."8 Because subject matter jurisdiction was not an issue in Snapper, the district court could have ordered
a remand only if there was a defect other than lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 9 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit examined the meaning of the
word "defect" as that word is used in Section 1447(c). 90
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that failure to follow the filing and
timeliness requirements enunciated in the statute governing removal
procedures can render removal defective.9 However, the court noted
that other grounds for remand exist that do not depend on any defect in
the removal.92 For example, the court mentioned that grounds for
remand tend to "arise in the contexts of forum selection clauses,
abstention, and supplemental jurisdiction."93 Most importantly, a
"remand based on a forum selection clause depends on an adjudication
of the meaning of the clause, a determination that is external to the
removal process.'
Whether a forum selection clause permits removal is determined by
the terms of the agreement.95 Just as "a determination that a federal
court should abstain in a particular case or that it should refuse to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state claims after
dismissal of all federal claims does not mean the removal was defective,"
so too a forum selection clause does not render removal defective.'
Instead, it is simply a matter of the federal court enforcing an agreement
similar to any other contractual adjudication.97 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the "remand order was not based upon a ground
specified in § 1447(c), and therefore § 1447(d) does not apply."8
VI.

PREEMPTION

In Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Insurance Co.," the Eleventh
Circuit was faced with the question of whether an employee's state law
claims for breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay, and fraud in the
inducement were preempted or superpreempted under ERISA and, thus,

88. 171 F.3d at 1252-53.
89. Id. at 1253.
90. Id.

91. Id.
92. Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

98. Id. at 1260.
99. 174 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 1999).
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were properly removed. A company named Simply Fashion provided its
employees with a cafeteria plan that included health, life, and long-term
disability insurance. After Simply Fashion's insurance carrier canceled
the group policy that Simply Fashion offered to its employees, Royal
Maccabees offered to provide a replacement group policy at the same
premium. Simply Fashion then issued a memorandum to its employees
informing them of the new life insurance coverage that would be
provided by a new carrier. Simply Fashion further informed the
employees that they would be enrolled automatically.'0 0
Royal Maccabees later backed away from its earlier representations
and instead offered a cheaper, nonportable policy to Simply Fashion.
This new policy was issued to Simply Fashion, not to Simply Fashion's
employees. However, Simply Fashion began collecting premiums from
its employees and issued two premium checks to Royal Maccabees.' 0 1
After the policy's effective date, Royal Maccabees required Simply
Fashion to provide a "statement from the company that there had been
no deaths or disabilities since the effective date" of the policy. 102 Well
after a month later, Simply Fashion responded, but stated only that "we
have had no death claims." 103 The letter did not mention any disabilities at Simply Fashion during that month when, in fact, one of Simply
Fashion's managers, Benedict Butero, had taken leave because of a
severe illness. Indeed, Butero died one day after Simply Fashion
notified Royal Maccabees that no outstanding death claims existed.'"
On the day Butero died, Simply Fashion received a letter from Royal
Maccabees in which Royal Maccabees declined Simply Fashion's request
for coverage and stated that no contract of insurance existed between
them. Royal Maccabees enclosed a check reimbursing Simply Fashion
for the premiums already paid by Simply Fashion. Annette Butero,
Benedict's widow, then
claimed benefits through Simply Fashion, but her
05
claim was denied.

Butero, joined by Simply Fashion, sued Royal Maccabees, one of its
employees, and an independent insurance agent. Defendants then
removed the case to federal court, arguing that the insurance policy was
part of a plan governed by ERISA. The court severed and remanded
plaintiff's claims against the independent insurance agent, leaving only
the claims against Royal Maccabees and its employee in federal court.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1210.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1210-11.
Id. at 1211.
Id.
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These defendants then moved to strike plaintiff's claims against them,
arguing that ERISA governed the policy and that all the remaining
claims were thus preempted. The district court agreed and dismissed
plaintiff's complaint without prejudice, which allowed plaintiff to refile
a complaint stating claims under ERISA.'"
There are two types of preemption that arise under ERISA. The first,
complete preemption or superpreemption, "arises from Congress's
creation of a comprehensive remedial scheme in 29 U.S.C. § 1132 for loss
or denial of employee benefits."0 7 The second, defensive preemption,
"provides only an affirmative defense to certain state-law claims." 108
Superpreemption requires the satisfaction of four elements: (1) there
must be a relevant ERISA plan; (2) the plaintiff must have standing to
sue under that plan; (3) the defendant must be an ERISA entity; and (4)
the complaint must seek compensatory relief similar to that available
under Section 1132(a), which will often be a claim for benefits due under
a plan.' O9
Because Simply Fashion was an employer, and Section 1132(a) does
not grant employers a cause of action for damages, Simply Fashion had
no standing to sue under ERISA; thus, their claims were not superpreHowever, the court found that Butero's claims were
empted.1"
superpreempted because the second, third, and fourth elements were
easily present."' The only remaining analysis was to determine
whether there was a relevant ERISA plan. This was subject to
the policy might
discussion because Royal Maccabees' refusal to issue
2
have precluded any plan from being established."
The court nevertheless found that a plan had been established."'
First, a plan is established by the employer's conduct, and in Butero the
employer had made multiple representations to its employees regarding
the prospective plan." 4 Moreover, the employer collected money for
the plan through payroll deductions from its employees, paid premiums,
and obviously intended for life insurance to take effect." 5 All these
actions demonstrated Simply Fashion's intent to establish a plan." 6

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1212.

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1214.

113. Id. at 1214-15.

114. Id.
115. Id. at 1215.

116. Id.
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Thus, the court concluded that there was a relevant ERISA plan and
that Butero's claims were superpreempted." 7
"Defensive preemption defeats claims seeking relief under state-law
causes of action that 'relate to' an ERISA plan.""' Because the court
determined that there was an ERISA plan, and because both claims
related to that plan, both of plaintiff's claims were defensively preempted." 9 Thus, "[tihe district court properly dismissed both plaintiffs'
claims with leave to refile."' 2 °
VII.

JURISDICTION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdictionand the Family and Medical Leave Act
In Wascura v. Carver,'2 ' the Eleventh Circuit had to decide, as a
matter of first impression, whether public officials in their individual
capacities could be classified as employers under the Family and Medical
Leave Act ("FMLA"). Plaintiff was a city clerk for fourteen years.
Defendants were the city's mayor, vice-mayor, and city commissioners.
Because plaintiff's son was near the end stage of AIDS and unable to
care for himself, plaintiff notified defendants of her son's illness and her
need to take time off to care for her son. Plaintiff planned first to
exhaust her vacation and sick pay and then take any remaining time as
unpaid leave. After plaintiff took off just twenty hours, the mayor told
her she should resign because of her situation at home. Plaintiff
refused, and defendants terminated her at a city commission meeting.

22

Plaintiff sued defendants in their individual capacities, claiming that
they terminated her because she attempted to exercise her rights under
the FMLA. Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that they were
not employers under the FMLA and thus could not be held individually
liable. Alternatively, defendants argued that they were entitled to
qualified immunity. After the district court denied defendants' motion,
defendants123filed an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified
immunity.
When analyzing interlocutory appeals regarding denials of qualified
immunity, the Eleventh Circuit has the authority to determine the

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
169 F.3d 683 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 684.
Id.
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threshold question of whether the actions allegedly taken by the
defendants violated federal law. 24 The Eleventh Circuit noted, "If a
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, that claim
cannot provide a basis for imposing liability, and it necessarily follows
that the claim states no violation of federal law."' 25 Because there is
no subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against a defendant who is
not an employer under the FMLA, the Eleventh Circuit began its
analysis by examining whether defendants met the statutory definition
of "employer" under the FMLA. 28
Prior to Wascura the Eleventh Circuit had addressed the meaning of
"employer" only under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act.'27 The court found that the FMLA's definition of "employer" is
much more expansive than these other statutes and that the FMLA
includes "'any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of
an employer to any of the employees of such employer.'' 2 Indeed, the
FMLA's definition of "employer" is "materially identical" to the definition
of "employer" found in the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 2 9
The Eleventh Circuit held in Welch v. Laney13 ° that the term
"employer," as it is used in the FLSA, does not include a public official
in his or her individual capacity. In that case the court held that under
the FLSA a sheriff was not an employer in his individual capacity
because he did not have "'control over [the plaintiff's] employment and
[therefore did] not qualify as [an] employer under the Act. ' "'3 Thus,
under Welch "a public official sued in his individual capacity is not an
'employer' subject to individual liability under the FLSA."'32 Because
the definition of "employer" is the same under the FMLA as it is under
the FLSA in Wascura the court found that "a public official sued in his
or her individual capacity is not an 'employer' under the FMLA and,
therefore, there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction over such a
claim.""3

124.
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127.

Id. at 685.
Id.
Id.
Id.

128. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4XA)(ii)(I) (1994)).

129. Id. at 685-86.
130. 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995).

131. 169 F.3d at 686 (quoting Welch, 57 F.3d at 1011) (alterations in original).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 687.
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Subject Matter Jurisdictionand Voluntary Dismissals
The Eleventh Circuit was confronted with a rather unique situation
in University of South Alabama v. The American Tobacco Co. 34 In
that case the University sued various tobacco companies and manufacturers for damages and restitution for money it spent on unreimbursed
medical care for tobacco-related illnesses. After plaintiff filed the case
in an Alabama state court, defendants removed it to federal district
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction." 5
On the following day, one defendant filed its answer. Less than a
week later, before any other defendant had answered, Alabama's
Attorney General filed a notice of dismissal, arguing "that he was the
proper plaintiff in this action because the University is an agency and
instrumentality of the state subject to the Attorney General's authority
After the University moved to
to direct and control litigation."'
remand, alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant who
had filed its answer joined in the Attorney General's request for
dismissal." 7
Following a hearing the district court issued an order dismissing the
entire action without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure because the Alabama Attorney General had authority
under state law to file a notice of dismissal. Thus, the court dismissed
the action as to all defendants without reaching the question of its
subject matter jurisdiction. The University then filed its appeal. 8'
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that normally
voluntary dismissals are effective immediately and "precede any analysis
of subject matter jurisdiction because [they are] self-executing and
[moot] all pending motions, obviating the need for the district court to
exercise its jurisdiction."'39 However, in this case, the district court
had "to determine a complex substantive issue of Alabama law," namely,
whether the 0 proper plaintiff had filed a notice of dismissal in the
B.

proceeding. 14

Therefore in order to determine whether the Attorney General's notice
satisfied the requirements of Rule 41(a)(1), the district court first had
to determine that the University was an agency of the state, that the
134. 168 F.3d 405 (11th Cir. 1999).
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University was subject to the authority of the Attorney General to
control all litigation in the state and, hence, that the Attorney General
had the authority to file a Notice of Dismissal.""
Clearly, none of these substantive rulings *should have been made
without the district court first determining whether it had subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the case because "removal jurisdiction is no
exception to a federal court's obligation to inquire into its own jurisdiction." 42 The Eleventh Circuit later concluded that the district court's
failure to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction rendered its ruling in
essence an advisory opinion.' 3 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to remand the
case to the state court.'"

VIII.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

The issue in Druhan v. American Mutual Life' 45 -whether an appeal
from a final judgment that resulted from a voluntary dismissal with
prejudice is within the Eleventh Circuit's jurisdiction-was one of first
impression for the court.'" In that case plaintiff alleged that she was
fraudulently induced to purchase a life insurance policy from defendant.
After discovering the fraud, she sued in Alabama state court. Defendant
responded by arguing that because plaintiff's policy was purchased in
connection with a benefits package provided by her employer, her state
law claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA"). Defendant then removed the case to federal court, in
essence treating the case as though it had been brought under
ERISA.147
Despite plaintiff's objections the district court agreed that ERISA
preempted her claims. Plaintiff then moved the district court to dismiss
her claim with prejudice because she stated that she had no claims
under ERISA and that the court's decision to deny her motion to remand
effectively left her without a remedy. The court granted plaintiff's
request and entered a final judgment dismissing her claims with
prejudice. Plaintiff immediately filed her appeal.'"
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Before determining whether a plaintiff could appeal from a final
judgment that was entered on her own motion for a dismissal with
prejudice, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it had no jurisdiction to
review the final judgment in the case because there was no case or
controversy. 149 Because neither party contended that the district court
erred in entering the final judgment-indeed, plaintiff had specifically
requested it-there was no adverseness and, thus, no case or controver50
sy.'
Ceding to plaintiff's wishes to look beyond the form of the appeal to
the substance thereof, the Eleventh Circuit held further that even
looking beyond the lack of a case or controversy, plaintiff's approach to
get the matter before the court was not statutorily authorized. 5 ' The
court stated, "In substance, this is not an appeal from a final judgment,
but an appeal from an interlocutory order denying the plaintiff's motion
to remand."'
Congress clearly set forth the instances in which an
appellate court may hear an appeal from an interlocutory order, and
denying remand is not on the list." 3 Thus, both in form and in
substance, the Eleventh5 4 Circuit had no jurisdiction over the appeal and
therefore dismissed it.
IX. CONCLUSION
This year's review of Eleventh Circuit cases adds new rules to the
federal landscape and contains a significant number of issues of first
impression. Hopefully, this Article will assist the bench and bar with the
ongoing complexities of federal court practice.
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